Abstract-To date, most solutions proposed for secure routing in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), assume that secure associations between pairs of nodes can be established on-line; e.g., by a trusted third party, by distributed trust establishment. However, establishing such security associations, with or without trusted third parties, requires reliance on routing layer security. In this paper, we eliminate this apparent cyclic dependency between security services and secure routing in MANETs and show how to bootstrap security for the routing layer. We use the notion of statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identifiers to implement a secure binding between IP addresses and keys that is independent of any trusted security service. We illustrate our solution with the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol and compare it with other solutions for secure routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the Internet where end users do not perform routing functions, mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) require end-user nodes to perform packet routing. In these networks, a pre-deployed, dedicated network fabric does not exist that routes packets and protects route integrity. Furthermore, MANET nodes are highly mobile and, consequently, the network topology changes frequently. Hence, every node must be able to maintain network connectivity, not just perform packet routing.
Early protocols that performed routing in MANETs assumed that all nodes were trusted; i.e., none of the nodes deliberately disrupted the routing protocol. More recently, several protocols were proposed to secure the routing layer from nodes that act maliciously and disrupt routing services. These protocols integrate security features within traditional routing protocols, such as DSR, AODV, and DSDV and aim to protect against message modification, fabrication or address spoofing through cryptographic means [2, 3, 4, 11, 13] . However, all these protocols assume that secure associations between the nodes of the network exist or can be established on-line. 1 Typically, these associations consist of either symmetric keys 1 Other protocols rely on intrusion-detection mechanisms to discover and isolate malicious nodes [7] , and tacitly assume that the intrusion-detection sensors running in network nodes are somehow protected from the nodes in which they are installed. In the end, these protocols still need to assume the presence of security associations to remove some of the less realistic trust assumptions made.
shared between any two nodes distributed with the help of a trusted key distribution center (KDC), or public-key certificates associated with individual nodes and signed by a trusted certification authority (CA). More recently, a distributed service for establishing trust relations among network nodes from PGP certificates has been proposed that does not rely on a trusted authority infrastructure [5] . Security associations and trust relations among nodes form the basis for building the security features of the routing layer; e.g., message authentication, replay detection.
The assumption of pre-established secure associations may be practical in environments where such associations can be established off-line [14] . However, this assumption is less suitable for secure routing in large open MANETs where secure associations have to be setup on-demand and on-line. In this case, a cyclic dependency arises between security services (e.g., certificate distribution, shared key generation, distributed trust establishment) and routing services since security services require routing layer security themselves (viz., Section II). To break this dependency, security associations must be bootstrapped into the routing layer without reliance on any security services.
In this paper, we show how to bootstrap secure associations for the routing protocols of MANETs on-line, without assuming any trusted authorities or distributed trustestablishment services. We rely on the use of statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identifiers [8] and public-secret key pairs generated by the nodes themselves, in much the same way SUCVs are used in MobileIPv6 (MIPv6) to solve the address "ownership" problem [8, 10] and to counter the "bidding down" attack [9] in return routability. We present the bootstrapping solution in the context of the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol and we compare our solution with other solutions for secure routing.
II. BOOTSTRAPPING SECURE ASSOCIATIONS

A. A Cyclic Dependency Problem
Routing and security are separate services in any network. The routing service depends on security services to authenticate the source of a message (i.e., its IP address) and the message content. For example, routing needs to determine that the source address of a route-request, route-reply, or control message was not spoofed, and that the message was not modified by malicious nodes while in transit between a source and a destination. The dependency between secure routing and security services is identified by arrow (1) in Figure 1 . Message authentication is typically implemented using either shared symmetric keys or public-private key pairs and requires that the shared or public keys are associated (bound) in a secure way with the nodes' (IP) addresses, online.
Security Services
To obtain secure bindings between a node's IP address and key, a node must either reach a trusted-authority node or must establish trust relationships with other nodes without relying on trusted authorities [5] . Even if we assume that the IP address of all nodes are known a priori, there is still the need to establish a route from any node to a trusted-authority node or to a peer node that does not include malicious nodes. If malicious nodes are present on any of these routes, they may launch denial-of-service attacks and, worse yet, impersonate trusted servers or peer nodes. Secure routing seeks to counter these attacks, typically by detecting the effects of malicious node actions on a route, and by finding alternate routes. Hence, both trusted authorities and distributed trust establishment without trusted authorities depend on secure routing services. This dependency is identified by arrow (2) of Figure 1 .
In summary, a cyclic dependency arises between security and secure-routing services, which we seek to remove for any secure implementation of routing services.
B. Breaking the Cyclic Dependency
To break the dependency cycle illustrated in Figure 1 , we have to remove dependency (1). Removing dependency (2) would be impractical because it would require that the nodes implementing security services be reachable by all other nodes in the network by a fixed set of routes; to implement any routing function for these nodes would defeat the purpose. We remove dependency (1) by using a secure binding mechanism for establishing secure node-to-node associations that is independent of both secure routing and other security services (viz., Figure 2 ). This mechanism forms the building block for bootstrapping security associations for secure routing protocols.
The idea of a secure binding between an IP address and a key that is independent of any other security services is due to O'Shea and Roe [10] and Montenegro and Castelluccia [8] . They used it in the context of securing the control messages of MIPv6. We briefly review the idea of secure <IP address, public key> binding for the sake of completeness and ignore its MIPv6 application specifics.
To generate an IP address that is securely bound to a public key, a node generates a 62-bit pseudo-random value by applying a one-way, collision-resistant hash function to the public key of its (uncertified) public-private key pair. Then, the IP address is generated as the concatenation of a network specific identifier (64 bits in MIPv6) and the hash of the public key (62 bits, 2 bits are reserved). The binding between this IP address and the public key is secure because it is computationally unfeasible for an attacker (1) to create another <public, private> key pair whose hash generates the same IP address (because of the second pre-image resistance of oneway, collision-resistant hash functions), and (2) to discover the secret key, or create a different one, for a given public key (by definition). Due to the size of the resulting address space, this IP address is also statistically unique. A source node uses the secure binding to authenticate its IP address and the contents of its packets to an arbitrary destination node as follows. The node signs a packet with its private key and sends the signed packet to the destination address together with its public key (and IP address). The destination node verifies that the IP address is securely bound to the public key by computing the hash function of the received public key and comparing the result with the lower 62 -bit field of the IP address. (Thus, the IP address "certifies" the validity of the public key thereby preventing an attacker from spoofing the source address.) Then, the destination node authenticates the content of the packet by verifying the signature with the public key.
This authentication scheme is implemented without using any security services. As illustrated in Figure 2 , dependency (1) is removed and replaced with dependency (1'), which does not lead to a cyclic dependency. Also, dependency (2') is added to indicate that higher-level security mechanisms, such as those of MIPv6, need to enhance the basic secure binding mechanism (e.g., to allow IP address changes) for different applications. Note that routing-layer authentication is also used to implement simple replay-detection mechanisms for routes (viz., Section III below). Finally, we note that bootstrapping of additional, different security associations for the routing layer becomes unnecessary.
III. AN EXAMPLE: SECURING DSR
In this paper, we illustrate our approach by providing end-toend security for the basic DSR [6] features without optimizations. (Optimizations in DSR make the protocol vulnerable to attacks [11] .) However, our approach can be applied to other routing protocols.
DSR is composed of two basic services, namely route discovery and route maintenance. In route discovery any source node S wishing to send a packet to any destination node D, to which it has no cached route, discovers a route to D. In route maintenance, source S detects if the route it is using to D is still valid in the face of topology changes. If the route is no longer valid, it initiates a new route discovery. In the rest of this section we present our scheme to secure DSR.
Route Discovery. When a source node S wants to discover a route to destination D 2 , it initiates route discovery. It constructs a Route Request message including the source (S) and destination (D) IP addresses, a random request identifier which it hasn't used recently, and an (initially empty) list to accumulate the addresses of intermediate nodes forwarding the request to D. Source node S digitally signs the source and destination IP addresses and the random request identifier. It appends the signature and its public key (1024 bits) to the packet and broadcasts it. Each intermediate node receiving the packet, if it has recently seen this request identifier from S or finds that its address is already on the node list, discards the Route Request. Otherwise it appends its address to the node list and rebroadcasts the packet. When the Route Request reaches its destination, node D authenticates the Route Request packet. First, D verifies the validity of the public key by hashing the public key and comparing the result to the lower half of the source S's IP address in the packet. Node D then verifies that it has not seen this request identifier recently from S. Then D verifies the signature on the packet. If the signature is valid D sends a Route Reply. It extracts the accumulated path in the Route Request, includes a copy of it in the Route Reply packet, and digitally signs the destination and source addresses, the request identifier, and the accumulated path. It then appends its public key and the signature to the packet, and source routes the packet on the reverse of this accumulated path. 2 Note that throughout this paper, whenever we refer to a destination node D, we assume that we already know the IP address of D, to which we are trying to find a route. Although security-relevant, finding the IP address of a given node is a separate problem unrelated to routing (viz., security aspects of DNS).
Alternatively it may also generate a symmetric key and encrypt it with the public key of S and append it to the packet. Nodes S and D can use this key to maintain a route between them i.e. for subsequent route discoveries caused by topology changes. Thus we use public-key cryptography only the first time we need to discover a route to a given node. The symmetric key exchange during the protocol is to replace costly public-key cryptography with symmetric key cryptography during address ownership verification. When source node S receives the Route Reply packet, it first authenticates the (source and content of the) packet and verifies the reply's validity. To authenticate the packet, S verifies the public key of destination node D by hashing it and comparing it against the lower half of the address of D. If the comparison yields a match, S proceeds to verify the validity of the reply. First, S checks if it has a pending Route Request to node D with the request identifier returned by the Route Reply packet. If it has one, then S extracts the node list out of the packet and compares it against the reverse of source route in the packet header. If this comparison yields a match, then S verifies the signature on the packet. If the verification succeeds the reply is valid and S caches this route. If any of the above checks fail, S discards the reply packet. Otherwise it extracts the encrypted symmetric key, if one exists, from the reply and checks the validity of the key i.e. ensures that it is not an old key generated by D for this route and caches it if valid. Figure  3 shows the flow of messages for route discovery with key exchange. The following topology is assumed for the message flow in Figure 3 where 1, 2 and 3 are arbitrary nodes in between S and D all or any of which could be malicious.
S 1 2 3 D
Route Maintenance. When sending a packet on an established route, source S includes the complete sequence of nodes through which the packet should travel. Each node along the path forwards the packet to the next node indicated in the path. If any node fails to forward it due to link failure or any other reason (detected by the link layer, in our case 802.11 MAC protocol), it signals a route error. A Route Error message consists of the IP addresses of the sender (of the route error message), receiver (of the route error message, in this case S) the details of the packet that caused the error, publickey and signature of the node signaling the error. Alternatively the node can append a MAC instead of a signature if it already shares a key with the receiver and in this case it will not append its public-key. It then source routes it to S on the reverse of the source route, up to the head of broken link, contained in the data packet. When source S receives a Route Error packet, it first authenticates it. Either by checking that the hash of the public key matches the lower half of the IP address of the node that signaled the error and that the signature is valid or by verifying the MAC with a key it shares with the signaling node as the case may be. Then S checks the validity of the Route Error packet. S checks that the address of the node that signaled the error is at the head of broken link in the route and that the source route in the Route Error matches S→ * (Rq, S, D, #, (empty list) (Rq, S, D, #, (1,2,3) ) {S, D, #} SK-S (PK-S) SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3) ) (K SD ) PK-S {SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3 SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3) ) (K SD ) PK-S {SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3 SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3) ) (K SD ) PK-S {SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3 SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3) ) (K SD ) PK-S {SR (3,2,1), S, D, #, (1,2,3) , K SD } SK-DS (PK-D) that of the packet up till the head of the broken link. If any of the checks fail S discards the error packet. Otherwise S removes the broken link from its route cache. For subsequent packets or the retransmission of this packet, source S may use any other route to that destination available in its cache or may initiate a new route discovery.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A variety of attacks, on DSR, have been identified in previous work [3, 4, 11, 13] . The attacks in general can be classified as routing disruption attacks and resource consumption attacks. In a routing disruption attack an attacker tries to disseminate false routing information thereby causing data packets to be lost, delivered to a wrong destination or routed over sub-optimal or longer routes. In a resource consumption attack an attacker tries to consume network resources or the resources of other nodes. In this section we discuss how the proposed secure version of DSR resists attacks by multiple non-colluding nodes.
In a routing disruption attack an attacker might try to forge a Route Reply. Since the protocol accepts replies only from the target node of the route discovery the attacker has to spoof the address of the target node in order to forge a Route Reply. Since the IP address of a node and it's public-key are cryptographically bound, the attacker cannot spoof the target node's address unless he gains access to the target node's private key. If the node initiating the route discovery and the target node of the route discovery already share a symmetrickey the attacker node should have access to that key to be able to forge a Route Reply as a MAC protects the route reply and the key proves the ownership of the address.
An attacker might try to modify the node list on a Route Request. He might delete some nodes from the node list to make that route preferred over other routes and drop all data packets i.e. create a gray hole. If the attacker deletes nodes from the node list of Route Request the target node will not be able to detect it. It will sign or compute a MAC on the node list and reverse routes a Route Reply to the initiator node. But this reply will never reach the initiator as some nodes on the source route are missing. The attacker might then modify the source route of the reply packet and send it back to the initiator. But the reply will not be accepted, as the source route on the reply packet and the node list in the reply do not match.
An attacker might add arbitrary or fictitious nodes to the node list. The destination or target node will not be able to detect this malicious action. It will sign or compute a MAC on the node list and reverse routes a Route Reply to the source or initiator node. And in the Route Reply he can skip the fictitious or arbitrary nodes he added and broadcast it to the next node in the list. The resulting route will be accepted as a valid route. The attacker thus convinced the source node that the route through him is longer than it actually is thereby making the source node chose another route over this route. The proposed solution does not prevent this attack. But the attacker does not gain anything more through this attack than what he would have if he dropped the Route Request or Route Reply packets in the first place.
Another routing disruption attack would be for a malicious node to signal false route errors or modify Route Error packets. The latter attack can be detected as a signature or a MAC protects the Route Error messages. Nodes that are not on a given route cannot signal a route error for that route. The former attack would be successful only when launched by a node at the head of the link that is being advertised as broken. If the attacker intends to disrupt the route by launching the above-mentioned attack he does not gain anything more than he would have by dropping the route discovery packets in the first place. But the attacker can launch a resource consumption attack by letting the route discovery packets pass through and signaling route error for data packets, thereby causing the source node to initiate a lot of route discoveries. We can thwart this attack by having multiple routes for each destination and sending packets over a more consistent route.
Another resource consumption attack would be to initiate a lot of route discoveries there by causing congestion in the network and making the destination node verify a lot of signatures. This attack can be mitigated by rate limiting the number of route discoveries that a node can initiate.
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS
In this section we briefly outline the differences between our solution and existing solutions for secure routing in MANETs.
(For a cost analysis of our solution, please refer to [1] .) In contrast to other solutions discussed below, our solution does not assume: 1) prior trust relations between nodes (e.g., common certification servers), 2) time synchronization between nodes, and 3) prior shared keys or other forms of secure associations.
Hu et al. propose two routing protocols, Ariadne, which secures DSR [4] , and SEAD, which secures DSDV [3] . Papadimitratos and Haas [11] propose a routing protocol, SRP, which secures DSR. All these protocols assume prior shared keys or prior secure associations among nodes wishing to communicate with each other. For instance, Ariadne and SRP assume shared keys between nodes. In addition, Ariadne as well as SEAD, assume that all the nodes in the network have an authentic TESLA [12] key chain commitment of every other node in the network. Further, Ariadne and SEAD also assume that all the nodes in the network are loosely time synchronized. However, when used in conjunction with TIK [4] , Ariadne can mitigate wormhole or tunneling attacks, in contrast to our solution. More recently, Sanzgiri et al. [13] proposed a secure routing protocol, ARAN, which assumes a trust relation between every node in the network and a certification server. Further, it assumes that all the nodes in the network can obtain a certificate from the server out-of-band. Thus, all of the above-mentioned protocols can only be deployed in environments where pre-established trust or security associations exist. 
